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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 Section 78-2-
2(3)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that: "The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction ..., 
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction[.]"2 This is an appeal from the final judgment 
of the Third District Court in a civil matter, and although it has original appellate jurisdiction, 
the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) 
and § 78-2a-3(2Xj), which provide that the Supreme Court may transfer any matter over 
which it has original appellate jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether jurisdiction over a non-resident is conferred by Utah's Unsolicited 
Commercially and Sexually Explicit Email Act, Utah's Long Arm Statute, or some other 
manner for the sending of an email which violates the Act. 
2. Whether the lower court committed error by dismissing this case for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. 
1
 Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5. 
2
 Ut. Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court should review the legal conclusions of the trial court (since this was a 
summary judgment it was resolved in toto upon legal conclusions) for correctness. 
"Generally, we review a trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, according the trial 
court no particular deference." Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fraclan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, P 11, 
54 P.3d 1177, 1181 (quoting Orion v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998)). 
This Court should review the statutory interpretations of the Third District Court for 
correctness. "We review the district court's statutory interpretations for correctness." Davis 
County Solid Waste Mgmt. v. City of Bountiful 2002 UT 60, P 9, 52 P.3d 1174. "We look 
first to the statute's plain language as evidence of the legislature's intent, and give effect to 
that plain language unless the statute is ambiguous." Id. at P 10. "We analyze the language 
of a statutory provision in light of other provisions within the same statute or act, and we 
attempt to harmonize the provisions in accordance with the legislative intent so as to give 
meaning to each provision." Id. 
The standard for granting a motion to dismiss requires the Court to determine that 
there is no state of facts which might be proven that would allow Plaintiff to any kind of 
relief. See, e.g., Reiner v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah. App. 1990); 
Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n. v. Allied Property & Cas. Ins. Co. 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995). 
Further, all allegations contained in the Plaintiff's pleadings must be accepted as true, and 
all inferences drawn in favor of Plaintiff when deciding the matter. See, e.g., Colman v. 
2 
Utah State Land Bd J95 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990); Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 841 
P.2d 742 (Utah App. 1992); Prows v. State, 822 P. 2d 764 (Utah 1991). "When the court 
rules on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding 
an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal 
jurisdiction to defeat the motion. Rainy Day Books, Inc. v. Rainy Day Books & Cafe, L.L. C., 
186 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (D.Kan. 2002). With that standard in mind, Plaintiffs complaint 
should not be dismissed as Defendant's have failed to show there is no state of facts which 
would allow Plaintiff to the relief sought. 
APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL 
There are none. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This case involves the sending of an unsolicited commercial email by MLeads 
Enterprises, Inc.. (Defendant/Appellee/MLeads) to Brittney Fenn (Plaintiff/Appellant/Fenn) 
for which Fenn brought this action in accordance with the Unsolicited Commercial and 
Sexually Explicit Email Act found in Utah Code Annotated §§ 13-36-101 to 13-36-105 
(2002) (the "Statute"). This is a case of first impression. 
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
Fenn filed this action in the Third District Court, Sandy Division on January 3, 2003 
alleging that MLeads sent or caused to be sent to Fenn an unsolicited commercial email in 
violation of the Statute. See Court Record (Ct. Rec.) p. 1-4. On April 4, 2003, MLeads filed 
its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, with supporting memoranda and the 
Affidavit of Shay Tyler. See Ct. Rec. p. 8-32. On April 16, 2003, Fenn filed her 
memorandum in opposition to motion to dismiss. Ct. Rec. p. 53-64. Defendant filed it's 
reply memorandum on April 21. 2003. See Ct. Rec. p 65-72. 
Without hearing, the lower court entered it's Memorandum Decision and Order 
Granting Defendant's Motion to dismiss on Jurisdictional Ground on October 14,2003. See 
Ct. Rec. p. 84-91. The lower court found that there was not proper jurisdiction and therefore 
granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. See Ct. Rec. p. 84-91. 
Fenn filed her Notice of Appeal on November 14, 2003 (Ct. Rec. pp. 95-97) with the 
Utah Supreme Court which subsequently transferred this matter to this Court. 
Facts established in the Record below: 
1. On or around August 28,2002, Ms. Fenn received an unsolicited email sent by 
or at the behest of Defendant. The email advertised an opportunity for a free quote on a 
home mortgage refinance. See Ct. Rec. p. 4. 
4 
2. The email did not have the characters: "ADV:" on the subject line. See Ct. 
Rec. p. 4. 
3. Ms. Fenn has never had any business or personal relationship with MLeads 
Enterprises, Inc.. See Ct. Rec. p. 55. 
4. MLeads generates leads with respect to loans to purchase property, and then 
transmits those leads on a bulk basis to financial institutions who then work with customers 
to provide loans. See Ct. Rec. p. 29. 
5. These leads are generated by the sending of commercial emails. See Ct. Rec. 
pp.4, 29, 55. 
6. MLeads never denied sending the email sent to Brittnev Fenn, rather they admit 
to having sent or caused it to be sent. See Ct. Rec. p. 29-30. 
7. MLeads advertises in the State of Utah. See Ct. Rec. pp. 4, 29, 55. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Section 13-36-101, et seq., commonly known as the Unsolicited Commercial 
and Sexually Explicit Email Act, itself provides a party who has received emails in violation 
of the requirements of that statute the ability to bring an action against the entity who sent 
or caused to be sent that email. Pursuant to the statute, jurisdiction is at least implied by 
providing a party with the ability to bring that action. 
2. Even if jurisdiction is not provided by Section 13-36-101, et seq., it is properly 
found against the Defendant in this case by Utah*5 long-arm statute, found in § 78-27-2^ of 
the Utah Code, because there are sufficient minimum contacts and subjecting Defendant to 
jurisdiction where it sends its emails does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.'* Jurisdiction should therefore be properly found in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. The Statute Itself Confers Jurisdiction Against Its Violators. 
The lower court erred in not conferring jurisdiction through Utah's Unsolicited 
Commercially and Sexually Explicit Email Act. Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-101 et seq. 
Section 13-36-105 of the Utah Code provides that "[f\or any violation of a provision of 
Section 13-36-103, an action may be brought by: (a) a person who received the unsolicited 
commercial email ... with respect to which the violation under Section 13-36-103 
occurred [.]" 
The defendant in this case fits directly within the confines of these provisions. The 
defendant sent, or caused to be sent an unsolicited commercial email through the 
intermediary of an email service provider. If he violated the provisions of the code, he 
availed himself of the jurisdiction here. It is difficult to imagine that the statute would not 
provide jurisdiction, especially given the language of the statute indicating the ability to bring 
an action. There is no qualification of jurisdiction, there is no qualification of meeting the 
requirements of a long-arm statute. It simply states that for any violation, an action may be 
brought. Id. The only logical inference is that jurisdiction is at least impliedly authorized 
by the statute. The lower court erred in this respect. 
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2. Even Without the Provisions of the Statute, This Court has Personal 
Jurisdiction Over the Defendant. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified the requirements for finding personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in Utah in, State ex rel W.A. 2002 UT 127. In that 
decision the Utah Supreme Court explained that: 
"The proper test to be applied in determining whether personal jurisdiction 
exists over a nonresident defendant involved two considerations. First, the 
court must assess whether Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over the 
nonresident defendant. This means that a court ma) rely on any Utah statute 
affording it personal jurisdiction, not just Utah's long-arm statute. Second, 
assuming Utah law confers persona1 jurisdiction over the nonresident 
defendant, the court must assess whether an assertion of jurisdiction comports 
with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Id. at f 14. Not only does the language of the email statute appear to confer jurisdiction, 
defendant's actions also subject him to jurisdiction through Utah's long-arm statute. Utah's 
long-arm statute is found in Section 78-27-24 of the Utah Code Ann. and provides in relevant 
part that: 
"Any person,... whether or not a citizer or resident of this state, who in person 
or through an agent docs any of the following enumerated acts, submits 
himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdictions 
of the courts of this state as to am claim arising out of or related to: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; ... 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of 
warranty!.]" 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-24(1), (3). The "transaction of business within this state" is 
defined as "activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state 
which affect persons or businesses within the state of Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-23(2). 
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'The Utah Supreme Court has applied a 'liberal and expansive construction' to the statutory 
definition of transacting business.'* Patriot Systems, Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 
1318, 1323 (D. Utah 1998) (citing Nova Mud Corp. v. Fletcher, 64SF.Supp. 1123, 1126 (D. 
Utah 1986)). Defendant's actions clearly place him within the reach of this statute. Just with 
a review of the email and website directed to by the email, it is obvious that he has attempted 
to obtain new Utah customers. It is most probable that he already engages in sales within 
Utah, a fact which can be determined through discovery. Even if not already conducting 
business. Defendant has caused injury to the plaintiff, as evidenced by the violation of the 
Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act. This should be enough to place 
him within the reach of the long-arm statute. 
Additionally, the placement of the offending email was entirely commercially driven 
and meant to transact business within the state. See Ct. Rec. p. 32, 54-59. This, 
alternatively, should be enough to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction within this 
state. There has been no denial that the email was sent to and received by at least the named 
plaintiff in the State of Utah. This fact must have been accepted as true for the lower court's 
decision. The nature of the offending email was entirely commercial in nature. See Ct. Rec. 
p. 54-59. This also, is not in dispute. This fact alone places the defendant and his actions 
within the reach of the long-arm statute. 
Furthermore, because long-arm statutes typically extend to the limits of due process, 
the Court need only consider whether exercising jurisdiction over defendants would be 
9 
consistent with the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-22. The Tenth Circuit uses a twofold inquiry to determine whether it is appropriate 
to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant through the due 
process analysis. See Rainy Day Books at 1162. "First, the court must determine whether 
the defendant has such minimum contacts with the forum state "that he should reasonable 
anticipate being haled into court there." Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, AAA U.S. 286,297 (1980)). "Within this inquiry the court must determine whether 
the defendant purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum, (citing Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, All U.S. 462, , 476 (1985)), and whether the plaintiffs claims 
arise out of or result from "actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial 
connection with the forum State." Id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court 
of California, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987)). "Second, if the defendant's actions create 
sufficient minimum contacts, the court must consider whether the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over defendant offends 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" 
Id. at 1162 (citing OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 
(10th Cir. 1998)). 
A. There are Minimum Contacts. 
These requirements have now been applied to situations very similar to this, where 
a plaintiff has sought jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant because of actions that 
occurred over the Internet. In this vein, courts in Utah have acknowledged that "a website 
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may form the basis of personal jurisdiction." [Access, Inc. v. WEBcard Technologies, Inc., 
182 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186 (D. UT 2002). Courts have also found that kk[e]ven a single 
contact can support specific jurisdiction." American Eyewear, Inc. v. Peeper's Sunglasses 
and Accessories, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 895, 900 (N.D. Tex. 2000). To find personal 
jurisdiction over such contacts as were made in this case, courts in Utah "analyze the level 
and type of activity conducted on the website in question to determine jurisdiction." iAccess 
at 1186. "A passive website that does no more than make information available cannot by 
itself form the basis of jurisdiction." Id. (citations omitted). Defendant's website and the 
offending email are clearly not passive. See Ct. Rec. p. 54-59. The emails sent by the 
defendant to the plaintiffs email address are obvious solicitations to do business. Id. 
"Personal jurisdiction, however, is established where a 'defendant clearly does business over 
the Internet[.]'" iAccess at 1187 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 952 F. Supp. 
1119, 1124(E.D.Pa. 1997)). 
In this case, defendant clearly was attempting to do business over the Internet. See 
Ct. Rec. p. 4, 29, 59, 88. The email sent to plaintiff was a direct and obvious solicitation to 
do business addressed to and received by a Utah resident and personal jurisdiction should 
have been found for that solicitation. Id. That is enough minimum contacts to satisfy the 
requirement. The U.S. Supreme Court evaluated this matter through a "stream of commerce" 
theory in Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102(1987). 
In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
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'The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not 
an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. 
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve 
the market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market 
in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for 
providing regular advise to customers in the forum State, or marketing the 
product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as a sales agent in 
the forum State.'' 
Id. at 107 (emphasis added). This is exactly what defendant's email was, advertisements in 
solicitation of commercial transactions. See Ct. Rec. p. 4, 29, 59, 88. The U.S. Supreme 
Court used that as evidence of purposeful availment in Asahi, and it should have been used 
as evidence of the same in this matter. 
It is unknown the amount of business the defendant carries on with Utah residents. 
What is known is thai they at least solicit business from Utah residents. See Ct. Rec. p. 4, 
29, 59. 88. Even if the amount of business defendant does is small, courts have used a 
relatively low threshold to find personal jurisdiction. The 6rh Circuit Court in CompuServe, 
Inc. v Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (Oth Cir. 1.996), granted personal jurisdiction over a Texas 
defendant, even though he had claimed \\z had never been to Ohio, and had '"sold less that 
$650.00 worth of his software to only (twelve) Ohio residents" over the Internet. Without 
discover}', the Court would never know if defendant's sales approach those in CompuServe. 
Additionally, the only facts given before the lower court are [hat "MLeads does not generate 
any substantial (i.e., over one percent (19c)) percentage of its revenues from activities in the 
State of Utah." See Ct. Rec. p. 31, <f 16. That statement does not provide any relevant 
information as the percentage of revenue is certainly relative to the amount of revenue 
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actually brought in. One percent of a million dollars is certainly a substantial amount of 
revenue. As defendant is soliciting wares for one of the currently most successful areas 
(mortgage refinancing) of business, it could easily be assumed that the amount of revenues 
generated are much greater than one million dollars. That information is not available, and 
would not be available without discovery, which was not permitted by the lower court. It 
was error for the lower court not to find minimum contacts. 
Even in the event the Court does not find defendant's actions to be commercial, there 
is also a middle category of websites, of which Courts have also found the requirements for 
personal jurisdiction to be fulfilled. This category is known as "interactive" website. These 
are websites "where a user can exchange information with the host computer." Id. at 1187. 
If the actual website maintained by the defendant is not commercial in nature, it is at least 
interactive, as shown by the email sent by the defendant to the plaintiff. See Ct. Rec. p. 4. 
As is readily discerned, just from the copy printed and provided as an exhibit for the 
complaint, there is an obvious offer to do business. Id. The entire purpose of the email is to 
solicit the sale of a product sold by the defendant. Id. 
Courts have found jurisdiction over the operator of a website when not a single sale 
was made within the forum state. See Starmedia Network, Inc. v. Star Media, Inc., 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 4870 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23,2001). In Starmedia, the court found that even though 
customers could not purchase products through the defendant's website, they "could register 
with the site and use the site to send comments to defendant." Id. at 1. This is similar to the 
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defendant's offending email. The comrriLercial message sent solicits the sale of defendant's 
product through clicking on a certain area which would carry the user to the defendant's 
website for purchase of the product. See Ct. Rec. p. 85. The entire purpose of the message 
is to solicit the sale of defendant's products. Id. 
Courts have also found personal jurisdiction appropriate where just one email was 
sent. A Mississippi court recently found jurisdiction from the sending of just one email. See 
Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F.Supp. 773 (S.D. Miss. 2001). The court in that case 
subjected the defendant, who maintained a "passive" web site, to persona] jurisdiction. Id. 
The court stated that "the medium in the instant case is an e-mail, which as actively sent to 
the recipient in hopes that the recipient would read its contents and patronize the Web site 
it was promoting. Id. at 777. The court held that the injury occurred in Mississippi, when 
the e-mail was received and opened. Id. In analyzing whether the fairness and due process 
rights of the defendant, the court reasoned that, in sending the e-mail advertisement all over 
the world, the defendant: 
"had to have been aware that the e-mail would be received and opened in 
numerous fora, including Mississippi. Accordingly, the Court finds that it 
would ne neither "unfair" nor "unjust" to subject her to personal jurisdiction 
in Mississippi. By sending an e-mail solicitation to the far reaches of the 
earth for pecuniary gain, one does so at her own peril, and cannot then 
claim that it is not reasonably foreseeable that she will be haled into court 
in a distant jurisdiction to answer for the ramifications of that 
solicitation." 
Id. at 779-80 (emphasis added). This is exactly what the defendant has done in this situation. 
The defendant has placed on its website, and admittedly others, to be sent to the computers 
14 
of internet users such as the plaintiff, a solicitation, that in this case was sent to the plaintiffs 
computer here in Utah. That solicitation would be and probably has been sent to computer 
terminals all over the world, including to other Internet users in Utah. It was done for 
pecuniary gain. Therefore, he has done it at his own peril and now "cannot then claim that 
it is not reasonably foreseeable that [he] will be haled into court in [Utah]." Internet 
Dooi^way at 780. The lower court erred in not finding sufficient minimum contacts. 
Further, the lower court, in a misplaced reliance upon one statement from First 
Mortgage Corp. v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1173 (D. Utah 
2001), found that because the email was sent to Plaintiff's residence that Defendant had not 
purposefully availed itself of this State's jurisdiction. See Ct. Rec. p. 107-08, f|[ 18-21. In 
First Mortgage, jurisdiction was not found because the Defendant had been subjected to the 
State's jurisdiction by the actions of another party. Id. In this case, Plaintiff had no part of 
Defendant's actions. She was only the recipient of those actions. That was error. 
B. The Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Will Not Offend "Traditional 
Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justicee" 
This second inquiry "requires a determination of whether the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant with minimum contacts is 'reasonable' in light of the 
circumstances surrounding the case." Rainy Day Books at 1162. "This inquiry requires a 
determination of whether the ... court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
is reasonable in light of the circumstances surrounding the case." Id. at 1162 (citing Burger 
King, All U.S. at 476). To determine the reasonableness, the court will consider the 
15 
following factors: "(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state's interest in resolving 
the dispute; (3) the plaintiffs interest in receiving convenient and effective relief; (4) the 
interstate judicial system' s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; 
and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social 
policies." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. 
Courts have found that, in this time of Internet communications, faxes, telephones, 
and relatively inexpensive travel, requiring defendant to litigate in this jurisdiction is not 
constitutionally unreasonable. See Rainy Day Books, supra. In addition, just as the court in 
Rainy Day Books had a strong interest in adjudicating disputes involving infringement, the 
courts in Utah have a strong interest in adjudicating disputes in regard to situations like this. 
For this purpose, the Utah legislature saw fit to pass the statute this complaint was brought 
under. This forum does not appear to be more advantageous for the plaintiff, than another 
even though she is located here, as witnesses and evidence are to be found both in Utah and 
in Arizona. It does not seem unreasonable for the defendant to have to defend this suit in the 
location where he sent or caused to be senl defendant's spam. The lower court's decision is 
not in accordance with those principles and should be reversed. To adopt the court's ruling 
is to eviscerate the spam statute. If recipients of the spam are unable to bring actions as 
permitted by the statute, why have a statute. If neither the spam statute nor the State's long-
arm statute provide jurisdiction, there simply is no possibility of enforcing the legislature's 
16 
remedy for the spam problem. It is an incorrect result and cannot be the result intended by 
the legislature. The lower court's ruling should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Appellant respectfully requests this 
Court reverse the error made by the Third District Court in this matter and find Defendant 
to be properly subjected to jurisdiction in this State. 
DATED this .-> day of April. 2004. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
Denver-C. Snuffer, Jr. 
^Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant MLeads "s Motion to Dismiss. 
2. Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act, Utah Code §§13-
36-101 to 13-36-105 (2002). 
ADDENDUM 1 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 
%A 
Jf 
v* 
<<? 
<%9 
J 
^ 
BRITTNEY FENN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
MLEADS ENTERPRISES, INC., and 
JOHN DOES one through ten whose 
true names are unknown, 
Defendants. 
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
ON JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
: Case No. 030400108 
Judge Denise Posse Lindberg 
If 1 This matter is before the Court on Defendant MLEADS ENTERPRISES, Inc. 
("Meads")* s Motion to Dismiss filed April 4, 2003 Defendant brings its Motion under Utah R. 
Civ. Pro. 12(b)(2) asserting lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Meads' Motion is 
supported by an affidavit filed by Shaw Tyler ("Tyler"), founder, shareholder and corporate 
secretary of Mleads. Plaintiff filed his Opposition on April 16, 2003. The Opposition 
memorandum is not supported by affidavit. Mleads replied on April, 21, 2003 For the reasons 
stated below Mleads' Motion is GP>ANTED. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
112 Plaintiff is a Utah resident who has brought this action on behalf of herself, alleging that 
Mleads has violated Utah's Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act, Utah Code 
Ann §13-36-101 to -105 (Supp. 2002) (the "Act"). 
113 Among other things the Act requires thai "[e]ach person who sends or causes to be sent 
an unsolicited commercial email . . to an email address held by a resident of the state shall" take 
certain actions to identify itself and the advertising nature of the message sent. Specifically, the 
Act imposes certain requirements on unsolicited commercial email messages1 ("UCEs") and 
authorizes a civil cause of action for violation of the Act's requirements §13-36-105. 
¥ %intifi attached a printout of the alleged UCE to her Complaint. The name of Plaintiffs 
l¥or example, the Act requires that senders include certain truthful information in its email, prohibits the 
use of certain misleading practices, and requires the sender to provide a mechanism allowing recipients to 
"unsubscribe" with respect to future email messages. Utah Code Ann. §13-36-103. 
Plaintiffs counsel appears at the top of the printout showing that the alleged UCE was printed 
horn the computer of Plaintiff s counsel The printout indicates that the UCE was sent "from" 
"Bnttney Fenn [BAF @ heartslc com]," and sent "to" "Spam Recovery (E-mail) " The printout 
furthei indicates, under the "Original Message" heading, that the original email was "from" 
"mleads [mailto-yoo @ yoodoohoo com]," and was sent "to" "Daf @ heartslc com " The subject 
line reads "Very Good News " The text of the email indicates tnat the recipient ma\ apply for 
lower interest rates The email invites the recipient to click on a webhnk, that appears m the 
bottom portion of the email, m order to receive a free quote Exhibit A to Complaint 
75 Defendant is an Arizona Corporation Defendant "generates leads with respect to loans to 
purchase property," Affidavit of Shaw Tylei, 1^2 [heremaftei "Affidavit"] 
*\}6 Tylei's Affidavit states that Defendant (a) does not maintain any offices m the State of 
Utah, (b) does not transact any business m trie State of Utah, (c) is not licensed to do business m 
the State of Utah, (d) does not employ or recruit any employees or agents m Utah, (e) does not 
have any banL accounts in Utah, (!) doe: not maintain any telephone 01 facsimile numbers 111 
Utah, [g) does not advertise or solicit business m Utah (h) does not have an) shareholders m 
Utah, (1) does not pay taxes m Utah, (j) does not generate any substantial percentage of its 
revenues from activities m Utah Affidavit at YIJ7-16 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
^7 Under Utah law, Plaintiff must make a prima facie case for assertion of jurisdiction over 
Defendant in order to proceed to trial on the merits Anderson v American Soc v of Plastic & 
Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990) The Court may determine jurisdiction on 
affidavits alone, permit discovery, 01 hold an evidential*} hearing If, as here, the Court proceeds 
on documentary evidence alone, Plaintiffs factual allegations are accepted as true unless 
specifically controvened by the Defendant's affidavit Any disputes m the documentary evidence 
are resolved in Plaintiffs favoi, and the Court does not weigh the e\ idence Id at 827 Sec also 
Ho \ Jim s Enterprises, 2001 UT 63 1^6. 29 P 3d 633 {quoting Colman \ Utah State Land Bd, 
795 P 2d 622. 624 (Utah 1990)) fu[I]f there is any doubt about whethei a claim should be 
dismissed for lack of factual basis, the issue should be resolved m favor of giving the part} an 
opportunity to present its proof") 
|^8 In this case Plaintiff has rested on the very genera1 factual allegations made in her 
Complaint "[0]nly the well pled facts of plaintiff s complaint as distinguished from mere 
conclusory allegations must be accepted as true " PurCo Fleet Sen , Inc 1 Towers, 38 F 
Supp.2d 1320, 1323 (D Utah 1999^ (quoting Wenz\ Memen Crvsial 55 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th 
Or 1995)(citations omitted) "[W]hen jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff cannot solely rely on 
allegations of -jurisdiction m its complaint in the face of an affidavit by defendant which 
specifically contradicts tiiose general allegations '" Roslcelle} & Co \ Lerco, Inc, 610 P.2d 1307 
(Utah 1980) Mleads has directly controverted Plaintiffs general allegations by way of affidavit 
ANALYSIS 
|^9 The Complaint's sole allegation with respect to jurisdiction is that "Defendant sent, or 
caused to be sent, to plaintiff an unsolicited commercial e-mail,'' which, according to Plaintiff, 
establishes this Court's junsdiction under Utah Code Ann §13-36-101 (Supp 2002) Complaint, 
P3, U14-7 
1110 Plaintiff does not claim that the Court can exercise general personal junsdiction over 
Mleads However, Plaintiff argues that by "appearing generally" to bring the present Motion, 
Mleads has conceded jurisdiction to this Court Opposition p 4 *jj3 Plaintiff further alleges that 
the Act itself, as well as Utah's long-arm statute, provide a basis for specific personal junsdiction 
over Defendant 
1[11 The Court rejects Plaintiffs "general appearance" argument In Ted R Brown & Assocs 
v Games Corp , 547 P.2d 206 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court made clear that Utah R 
G\ P. 12(b) abolished the distinction between general and special appearances Mleads did not 
concede jurisdiction 10 tins Court by bringing its Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction Rather, Rule 12(b) anticipates that multiple defenses may De raised m the same 
motion without waiving any of the defenses Thus, in addition to its "lack of jurisdiction over 
the person" defense, Mleads could properly argue other defenses without conceding jurisdiction 
to this Court Barlow v Crapo, 821 P.2d 465 (Ut App 1991), which Plaintiff cites m support of 
hei argument, is unavailing That case involved a defendant s claim of forum non conveniens 
In a forum non conveniens case the moving party does not contest that the forum can 
appropriately exercise personal jurisdiction Rather, the claim is that there is another, similarly 
appropriate forum that could hear the matter, and it would be more convenient for the litigants 
and/or witnesses to have the matter heard m the that other forum That is not Defendant's claim 
in this case Rather, Defendant claims that this forum cannot appropriately exercise personal 
jurisdiction under the applicable constitutional standard 
1112 On the question whether the Court may exercise specific personal junsdict ion m tins case. 
' specific jurisdiction gives a court powei ove: a defendant only with respect to claims arising out 
of particulai activities of the defendant in the forum state " Arguello ^ Industrial 
Woodworking Machine, 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992) The Utah Supreme Court recently 
clarified the law on this issue In determining whether such jurisdiction exists, this Court must 
first assess whether Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident Defendant If 
Utah law confers such personal junsdiction, the Court must then determine whether the assertior 
of jurisdiction comports with constitutional due piocess requirements State ex rel W A. 2002 
UT 127<f 14 
*jl3 The Court cannot agree with Plaintiffs contention that the Act provides foi exercise of 
junsdiction over nonresident defendants Unlike other provisions of Utah law m which the 
legislature has expressh authorized the exercise of such jurisdiction, see c g Utah Code Ann 
§78-3a-l 10(13), the Act is silent with respect to jurisdiction The logical inference is that the Act 
is limited to establishing a cause of action against those who violate its substantive requirements 
but onh to the extent that the Court can property exercise personal jurisdiction ovei such 
defendants 
[^14 Since the Act itself does not confer jurisdiction over nonresident defendants the Court 
must look to Utah's long-arm statute to see if it reaches the conduct of wnich Plaintiff complains 
Utaii s long-arm statute, § 78-27-24, provides, in relevant part 
An) person whether 01 not a citizen or resident of this state who in person or 
thiough an agent does any of the following enumerated acts submits to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim ciusuig out ofoi related to 
(1) the transaction of an) business withm this state, 
(3) the causing of anv injury withn this state whethei tortious oi by breach 
of warranty (emphasis added, balance of section omitted) 
*[|15 "[T]he words 'transaction of business within this state' mean activities of a nonresident 
peison ms agents o1 lepiesertanve:n. this state vnich affec' peison* or businesses withm the 
state of Utah"' Utah Code Ann $ 7pJT-2:<2> (Supu 1°96) 'The Utah Supreme Court has 
applied a 'liberal and expansive construction' to the statutory definition of transacting business " 
Patnot Systems Inc \ C-Cubed Corp 21 F Supp 2d 1318 1323 (D Utah 1998)(citwg Nova 
Mud Corp \ Fletcher 648 F Supp 1123, 1126 (D Utah 1986)) Additionally the legislature 
has declared that the long-arm statute should be ' applied so as to assert jurisdiction to the fullest 
extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution" Utah Code Ann §78-27-22, see also First Mortgage Corp -\ State Street Bank 
and Trust Co 173F Supp 2d 1167, 1173 (D Utah 2001} 
<j|l 6 Defendant has affirmatively claimed it does not engage m business activities within the 
State of Utah Plaintiff has failed to piovide, b\ way of affidavit, any facts that would create a 
disputed material issue of fact legal ding Plaintiffs I epresentations of its business activities 
withm the state Thus, the sole apparent nexus oetween Defendant and this state is the alleged 
UCE received by tne Plaintiff Assuming without deciding, tnat the alleged UCE constitutes a 
"tiansaction of business v* lthm this state" within m tne meaning of Utah's long-ami statute, the 
Court must determine whethei sufficient "minimum contacts" exist between Defendant and this 
state such that "the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice " International Shoe Co \ Hashington* 32b U S 310(1945) 
€(P n "The Due Process Clause protects ai individual's hbert} interest m not being subject to 
the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or 
relations'' Burgei King Corp \ RudzeMicz 471 U S 462 473(1985) "The minimum contacts 
necessan for specific personal jurisdiction are established if the defendant Has purposeful!} 
dnected his activities at lesidents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that 
' arise out of ox l elate to' those acm lties " Soma Medical Int 7 i Standard Chartered Bank 196 
F.3d 1292 1298 (10th Cu 1999) (internal citations and quotations omitted) The Court must 
examine the cmantitv and quality of contacts with the state to determine if these contacts are 
sufficient to support the Court's exercise of personal lunsdiction If the Court determines that 
theie are minimum contacts between Defendant and this forum, tne Court must then determine 
whethei the cause of action arose from those contacts and, if so the Court must balance the 
convenience of the parties and the mteiests of the State m asserting jurisdiction 
1)18 The email message of which Plaintiff complains is arguabh a solicitation to do business 
Solicitation has been recognized as "evidence suggesting purposeful availment" of the benefits 
provided by the forum state Fai West Capital Jnc i Towne 46 F 3d 1071, 1076 (10th Cir 
1995) In his Affidavit Tyler asserts that Mleads hired a third party independent contractor to 
market Mleads' services to "consumers," including Plaintiff, see Affidavit, at 2, 113, and that at no 
time "prior to the transmission [did Mleads] learn any information regarding the locale or 
identity o f Plaintiff Id at 3, 1^4 Further, Tyler asserts that the third party marketing company 
did not provide any personal or contact information about Plaintiff pnoi to the transmission of 
the alleged UCE nor would have provided such information "even if requested by Mleads " Id 
Tj 19 The sworn lepresentations in the Tyler Affidavit have not been directly contraverted by 
Plaintiff Although the language of the Affidavit appears to be purposefully vague, the Court 
understands the above-referenced statements m the Tyler Affidavit, see supra 1118, to mean that 
Mleads had no knowledge, prior to the email being sent (presumably by the intermediary 
markeimg company;, that a solicitation would be directed to a resident of this State As such, the 
Couii concludes that this single contact should not be construed as Defendant's knowmgh and 
purposefully availing itself of the benefits of this forum Moreover, case law indicates that "a 
connection with the forum arising from the Plaintiff s place of residence, does not satisfy the 
purposeful availment requnement " First Mortgage Corp , 173 F Supp 2d at 1174 (emphasis 
added), see Omi Holdings Jnc \ Roval Ins Co Of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10lh Cn 
1998) Since the single contact of which Plaintiff complains is grounded on fact that the email 
was sent to an email address held by a Utah resident, the contact arguably arises sole!} from 
Plaintiffs place of residence and, as such, does not establish purposeful availment First 
Mortgage Corp 173 F Supp 2d at 1174 On these facts the Court concludes that there are 
insufficient minimum contacts between Defendant and this forum to warrant exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over Defendant 
1(20 The Court also rejects Plaintiffs final aigumenf m support of specific personal 
jurisdiction, which is that Plaintiff has suffered "injur}, as evidenced by the violation of toe 
[Act] " See Opposition, at 7 Plaintiff does not elaoorate on the basis foi tne claimed injur}, but 
given that Plaintiffs Opposition cues general!} to subsection (3) of the long-arm statute ("tne 
causing of any injur}/ within this state whether tortious oi by breacn of warrant}") Utah Code 
Ann §78-27-24(3), the Court infers that Plaintiff is claiming some sort of tort-based injury2 
' p i Even if the Court weie to accept that the email at issue here is a UCE unde^ the Act, 
nothing m the Act s plain language comes close to suggesting that leceiving a UCE constitutes a 
tort-based injur} See eg Goff\ Carrot Bunch. Ci\ 02O411292 (3rd Dist Utah, April IS 
2002; ( Utah s Act does not recognize an} level of "injur}'' on tne part of the recipient of an 
email, rathei it merely requires the mitiatoi of such an email to comply with statutory 
reauirements oi face civil penalties; Cf tnnce I Beai Rive? Miu Ins 2002 UT 68 %1 
("Where a statute piovides a specific civil legal remed} to reaiess an injury in violation of that 
"iNothmg m Plaintiffs Complaint oi Opposition can be reasonably construed as stating a claim based on 
"bieach of warranty ' 
statute, a tort action for violation of the public policy embodied m the statute will not he") 
ORDER 
^22 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss foi lack of personal junsdiction is GRANTED 
Defendant's counsel to piepaie and submit proposed Ordei IT IS SO ORDERED 
Entered this 26th da) of September, 2003, b> the Court 
^^^S^ 
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ADDENDUM 2 
DOLJ COMMERCE AND TRADE 13-36-103 
5) wnether the franchisees 01 the same line m a t e in 
that relevant marKet are^ are providing aaeauate service 
to consumers tor ' h e oowe^sport \ emcles ot tne iine-mai^e 
wmcn biiail mcmae tne adeauac^ of the powersport vem 
cie saie and. se^ ice iacxiities eauiDment ^UPPIV 01 vemcie 
parts ana auaimea service Dersonne 2002 
13-25-307 F r a n c h i s o r ' s r e D u r c n a s e o b l i g a t i o n s upon 
terminat ion o r n o n c o n t m u a t i o n oi francnise 
1) Upon the termmatior or noncontmuation 01 a rranchise 
ov tne rrancmsor tne Tancnisor chall pa* tne rrancmsee 
(a; the rranchisee s cost or new undamaged andunsoia 
powersport "venicies in tne rrancmsee s inventor^ acauirea 
rrom the rrancmsor or another rrancmsee 01 the same 
line-make representing Poth the current model year at 
tne uime 0 e m u l a t i o n or noncontmuation and the im 
mediately prior mode1 "ear vehicles 
1) plus any cnarges maoe bv the rrancoisor or 
distnoution denven or taxes 
n) plus the ffancnisees cost of any a< cessones 
added on the vemcie shal be ^euorcnased and 
<mj less all allowances paid or credited to the 
franchisee b \ the rrancmsor 
(bi th^ cost or all new undamaged and unsold sup-
plies parts and accessories as set rorth m the rranchisor s 
catalog at the time 01 termination or noncontmuation for 
thp supplies p a n s and accessories less ili allowances 
paid or credited to the franchisee by the rrancmsor 
ic the iair market vaiue out not less than tne franchi-
see s depreciated acquisition cost of eacr undamaged sign 
owned by the franchisee that bears a common name trade 
name or t rademark of the rrancmsor if acquisition of the 
sign was recommended or required by the rrancmsor If a 
franchisee has a sign with multiple manufacturers listed 
the franchisor is omv responsiDie tor 113 pro ra ta portion or 
the sign 
id) the fair market /alue but not less than the fran 
cnisees depreciated acauisition cost 3t ah special tools 
equipment and furnishings acquired from the franchisor 
or sources approved ov the rrancmsor fhar we^e recom 
mended or required, by the franchisor and are in good and 
usable condition and 
ve) the cost of t ransport ing handling, nacitmg, and 
loading powersport vehicles, supplies par ts accessories 
signs special tools eauioment and fu rn i sh ing 
(2) The franchisor shall pav the rrancmsee the amounts 
^oecihea m Subsection 1) within 90 dovs arte7* the lender 01 
the property to the tranchisor if the rrancmsee 
13.1 nas dea r titic to tne proper "y and 
(b> is m a position to convex title to the francmsor 
(3) If repurchased inventory and equipment are suoiect to a 
security interest the franchisor may maKe payment omtlv to 
the rrancmsee and to the holder or the secur i r interest 2002 
CHAPTER 36 
UNSOLICITED COMMERCIAL AND SEXUALLY 
EXPLICIT EMAIL ACT 
Section 
13-36-101 
13-36-102 
13-36-103 
13-36-104 
13-36-105 
Title 
Dennitions 
Unsolicited commercial or sexualb exuhci^ 
email — Reauirements 
Cnrmnal penalty 
Civil action for violation — Election on dam-
ages — Costs and attorney tees — Defense 
13-36-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Unsolicited Commei cial and 
Sexually Explicit Email Act ' 2002 
13-36-102 Def in i t ions 
-is used n this chapter 
1 "Commercial' means for the purpose ot oromotiae 
the sale lease or exchange m goods services or real 
pronert" 
2) Compute1- netTTTor^ means two o^ more computer-
that are nterconnected to excnange electronic messages 
hies data o r other niormation 
3 Tmai l means an electronic message die data or 
other niormation that is t ransmitted 
la; oetween two or more computer: compute^ i e t 
worics IT electronic terminals or 
bi within a compute1- networiv 
(4) 'Emai address means a destination commonlv 
expressed as a string or characters to wnicn email mai be 
sent 01 delivered 
5^ Ema1! service provider means a person that 
(aJ .s an mtermeoiajr m the transmission or email 
from the sender to the recipient or 
ib; provides to end users or email service the 
abintv to send and receive email 
<6j 'Internet domain name means a glooallv unique 
hierarchical reierence to an Internet host or service 
assigned through centralized Internet authorities com 
prising - series Ox character strings separated bv periods 
1
 luxi one ngiii mosu string zDez^iying the top or tne me1-
ar am 
(7) 3.1 'Se<cuallv °xpncit email' means an emai1 that 
contains promote^ or contains an electronic link to 
material that is harmful tc minors as defined m 
Section 76-10-1201 
(hi An email is a sexually explicit email" if it 
meets the dennition m Subsection (7Xa> even .f the 
email also meets the definition of a commercial email 
(8) (a ULnsoncited means without the recipients ex-
press permission except as provided m Suosection 
l8)(b) 
(b) A commercial email is not "unsolicited" if the 
sender has a preexisting busmess or personal rela-
tionship with the recipient 2002 
13-36-103. XJnsolicitea commerc ia l or sexua l ly explicit 
email — Requirements . 
(\ Each person who sends or causes to be sent an unsolic-
ited commercial email or an unsolicited sexuallv explicit email 
through the intermediary of an email service provider located 
xn -he state or to an email address heid bv a resident of the 
state shall 
(a; conspicuous^ state m the email the sender s 
(1) legal name 
(ID correct street address and 
(111 j valid Internet domain name 
(b) include in the email a suDiect line tha t contains 
(1; ror a commercial email, "ADV as the first four 
characters or 
(11 *or a sexuallv explicit email "ADV ADULT" as 
the first nine characters 
(c) provide the recipient a convenient no-cost mecha-
nism to notify the sender not to send anv future email to 
the recipient including 
11) return email to a valid functioning re turn elec 
tronic address and 
(11; for a sexuallv explicit email and if the sender 
has a toll-free telephone numoer tne sender s toll-
rree telephone number and 
(d) conspicuously provide in the text of the email a 
notice that 
u) mtorms the recipient tha t the recipient mav 
conveniently and at no cost be excluded from ruture 
6-104 COMMERCE AND TRADE 564 
commercial or sexualh explicit email as the case 
ma\ De from the sender and 
tu j ro r a sexualh explicit email and if the senOe r 
has a toll-free telephone number includes tne send-
er s valid toll free telephone numbe^ tna t the recipi-
ent ma^ call to be excluded rrom nature eman from 
tne sender 
A person who sends or causes to be sent an unsolicited 
lercial email or an unsolicited sexualh explicit email 
tgTii the intermediary of an email service provider located 
e s tate or to an email address neid b\ a resident of the 
mav no t 
(aj use a third party s Internet domain name m ldenti-
vmg the pomt of origin or in stating the transmission 
Dath of the email without the third party s consent 
(b) misrepresent a m iniormauon in identifying the 
ooint of origin or the transmission pa th of the email or 
(c) fail to mciude m the email the information neces-
sary to luentm the pomt of origin of tne email 
If the recipient of an unsolicited commercial email or an 
hcited s e r u a l h explicit email notifies tne sender tha t the 
nent does not want to receive future commercial email o r 
re sexua lh explicit email respectively from ttie sender 
sender rna\ not send that recipient a commercial email or 
mallv explicit email as the case mav be either direct!v or 
ugn a subsidiary or affiliate 2002 
•6-104. C r i m i n a l pena l ty . 
A person whc violates am reouirement of Section 13-
03 w i th respect to an unsolicited sexually explicit email is 
ty of a class B misdemeanor 
> A criminal conviction or a penalty assessed as a result of 
lmmal conviction under Subsection vl) does not relieve the 
son convicted or assessed from civil liability in an action 
Ler Section 13-36-105 2002 
36-105. Civil a c t i o n for v i o l a t i o n — E l e c t i o n o n 
d a m a g e s — Costs a n d a t t o r n e y fees — De-
f e n s e 
1) For any violation of a provision of Section 13-36-103 an 
ion m a v be Drought by 
(a) a person who received the unsolicited commercial 
email or unsolicited sexualh7 explicit email with respect to 
which the violation under Section 13-36-103 occurred or 
(b) an eman service provide^ through whose xacilities 
the unsolicited commercial email or unsolicited sexuall} 
explicit email was t ransmit ted 
2) in each action unae1- Subsection '1) 
[ a; a recipient or email service provider mav 
(11 recover actual damages or 
(n) eiect IT lieu of actual damages to recover the 
lessee or 
(A $10 per unsolicited commercial email or 
unsolicited sexualh explicit eman received b\ 
the recipient o^ t ransmit ted tnrough the emai1 
service provider or 
(B) S25 000 per day tna t the violation occurs 
and 
(b) each prevailing recipient 0^ email service provider 
shall be awarded costs and reasonable attorney lees 
^3J An email service provider aoe^ not violate Section 13-
j-103 soien b\ oemg an mte rmed ia r between the sender 
id recipient in the transmission of an email tha t violates 
lat section 
f4) The violation of Section 13-36-103 bv an employee does 
ot subiect the employees employer to liability under that 
action if tne empioveer; violation of Section 13-36-103 is also 
violation of an establisned poncT 01 tne emplover that 
eauires compliance with the requirements of Section 13-36 
03 
(5) It is a defense to an action Drought unde*- this section 
that the unsolicited commercial email or unsolicited sexualh 
explicit email was t ransmit ted accidentalh 2002 
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P a r t 1 
G e n e r a l P r o v i s i o n s [Effect ive J a n u a r y 1, 2004] 
Section 
13-37-101 Title [Effective J a n u a n 1 2004] 
13-37-102 Definitions [Effective J a n u a n 1 2004] 
P a r t 2 
N o t i c e of D i s c l o s u r e [Effect ive J a n u a r y 1, 2004] 
13-37-201 Required notice [Effective J a n u a n 1 2004] 
13-37-202 Disclosure of nonpublic personal information 
prohibited without notice [Effective January 
1 2004J 
13-37-203 Liability [Effective January 1 2004] 
P A R T I 
GENERAL P R O V I S I O N S [EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 
2004] 
13-37-101. Ti t le [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004]. 
This chapter is known as the "hotice of Intent to Sell 
Nonpublic Personal Information Ac t ' 2003 
13-37-102 Def in i t ions [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004] 
As useo in this chapter 
(1) 'Affiliate means a person tna t controls is con-
trolled b\, or is under common control with 
(a) a commercial entit} r ana 
(bj (1) directly or 
uij indirectly through one 0^ more intermedi-
aries 
(2Ma Subject to Subsection (2)(b) "commercial en-
tity ' means a person that 
u> has an office or other place of busmess 
located m the s ta te and 
(11 in t h c o r a m a n course of business trans-
acts a consumer transaction m this state 
(b) "Commercial en t i n ' does not mciude 
(1) a governmental entity or 
(n) an entity providing services on benalf of a 
governmental entity 
'3 "Compensation means anything of economic value 
that is oaid o** transferred to a commercial entitv to^ or in 
curect consideration of the disclosure o^  nonpublic per-
sonal uiiormation 
(4 la; "Consumer transaction5" means 
(1; a sale lease assignment award by chance 
o-" other writ ten o r oral transfer or disposition 
(A that is initiated or completed in tms 
state and 
(B) or 
(I) goods 
(II) services 0^ 
rIID other tangible or intangible 
propert} except securities ana insur-
ance or services related thereto or 
